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Investment appraisalThis paper is concerned with forecasting trafﬁc accidents at a relatively aggregate level and over a long time pe-
riod; the sort of information that is required as part of a comprehensive cost-beneﬁt analysis of amajor transpor-
tation investment or policy change. It is not so focused on appraising the social value of speciﬁc safety measures,
although some of the points made seem germane. Whereas there has been much ex ante analysis at the meso-
and macro-levels looking at the causes of accidents and ways of reducing both their number and severity,
much less ex post has been done considering the accuracy of predictions of accident rates after an investment
or policy initiative. Given the evidence that exists on the accuracy of trafﬁc forecasts, especially involving oft
over-optimistic predictions of public transit and rail use, there is at least a prima facie case for arguing that
many investment and policy decisions are being based, in part, on over favorable assumptions with regard to
their aggregate safety impacts.
© 2014 International Association of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Safety is amajor concern of transportation planners and engineers in
their design of transportation infrastructure and its use. It is also, both
out of self-interest and also the result of public policy, central to the be-
havior of those that make use of the transportation system, and in some
cases those that live or work adjacent to transportation infrastructure.
Having relatively good forecasts of the safety associated with a trans-
portation system, or parts of it are thus important. Added to this, be-
cause decisions often involve a long-term perspective, is a need to
have relatively good forecasts of future accident levels; and it is this lat-
ter subject that concerns us in this essay.
In terms of content, this is essentially an economics paper, with the
major, although not only, interest being in the costs of accidents, and
ipso facto of preventing them. In the sense that many transportation in-
vestments are partially justiﬁed as having an implicit positive impact on
accident levels, it also have an inherent policy undertone. In particular,
we are concernedwith the types of distortion that can occur in calculat-
ing the full economic beneﬁts of a transportation investment or policy
change, and especially any of the safety effects, when trafﬁc forecastsn of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences.
and Safety Sciences. Production aare poor.1 While the technical safety aspects of such things as road de-
sign and its associated architecture, and trafﬁcmanagement approaches
have been quite intensively studied, and are essential for evaluating
local initiatives, such detailed analysis is of limited use when assessing
large projects unless the trafﬁc forecasts used are reasonable.
In considering the links between the need for reasonably accurate es-
timates of individual accident costs and trafﬁc forecasting, the paper has
its boundaries. We focus almost exclusively with matters of road safety
and surface public transportation. There are important issues regarding
the poor forecasting records of demand for other modes, and these un-
doubtedly have implications for safety policy, but space constraints pre-
clude discussion extending into the air or to water modes. Additionally,
we are only concerned with safety in terms of trafﬁc accidents; it does
not look at issues of security. While there is a perturbing trend for delib-
erate attacks on vehicles or using them for delivering an attack, including
car and bus bombings, the issue of poor trafﬁc forecasting, as far as one
can tell, is not a major factor in trying to predict where they will occur.
2. The cost-beneﬁt analysis calculation
Transportation investments involving the public sector generally
involve considerations of both positive economic efﬁciency and1 This usually involvesmeso-level projects such as major new freeways or public trans-
portation system investments but may include signiﬁcant policy changes such as modiﬁ-
cations to speed limits. Itmayalso includemacro-level studies that forecast future national
accident levels of the type done by Broughton [1] for the U.K. and Ulf Brüde [2] regarding
Sweden.
nd hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
5 This point was made by Brüde [2] in the context of forecasting trafﬁc accidents in
Sweden, “Making forecasts entails extrapolating the regression model outside the area
where the observations were made. Making forecasts differ considerably from taking a
random sample from a well-deﬁned population and performing statistical interference,
i.e. point and intervals estimates of expected valueswithin the range of observations. This
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beneﬁt (or ‘beneﬁt-cost’ to use the U.S. terminology) analysis [3]. Al-
though practical limitations often mean that the analysis is partial,
strictly, in a formal sense cost-beneﬁt analysis involves estimating the
monetary value of the widest range of effects of a project or policy
over the long-term, taking into account such things as non-traded
costs and beneﬁts, and the implications of actions on future, as well as
current generations. This can be expressed formally as;
NPVSW ¼
XG¼x
G¼1
XT¼K
t¼1
aP BGTð Þ−bP LGTð Þ
1−ið ÞT
 
ð1Þ
where:NPVSW is the social net present value; aP(BGT) is the probable so-
cial beneﬁt to be enjoyed by individual a in year T as a result of the
investment's completion; BGT is given a weighting a, to reﬂect society's
welfare preference; bP(LGT) is the probable social cost imposed on indi-
vidual in b year T as a result of the investment's completion. LGT is given
a weighting b, to reﬂect society's welfare preference; i is the relative
social weight attached to a cost or beneﬁt occurring in a given year
(the social discount rate); K is the anticipated life of the investment;
and G is the number of individuals affected.
Because most transportation investments involve superior design
and trafﬁc control systems than their predecessors, safety normally en-
ters the calculus as a beneﬁt (an element in B). The monetary value of
reduced accidents on the transportation system embraces mortality
and morbidity considerations along with material damage to vehicles,
road architecture, and adjacent buildings.2 It covers not only the imme-
diate transportation infrastructure under consideration, but also, be-
cause of normal route and mode diversions, embraces a signiﬁcantly
larger network than that immediately impacted.
The economic contribution of changes in safety for this type of exer-
cise has come in the form of placing a ﬁnancial value on accident reduc-
tions. Themethodologies for doing this have evolved over the years, and
are well rehearsed in academic and professional writings.3 A compre-
hensive study essentially involves estimates of the costs of repairing/
replacing the physical equipment and infrastructure that are damaged
in accidents, the costs of any medical and other public services that
may be required to deal with the accident and handle trafﬁc congestion,
the time costs imposed on delayed drivers as a result of the accident,
and the “costs” to the individuals involved and their kith and kin; this
latter element being by far the most problematic to evaluate.
There is an inherent social aversion to valuing the loss of a life and, to
a lesser extent, an injury. The earliest approach to valuation of life fo-
cused on the welfare loss of the individual killed with an almost arbi-
trary addition of an indirect effect to reﬂect the costs felt to those
close to the individual; lost output or consumption being an oft used
measure of the direct cost. This calculation, given knowledge of such
things as income and average life expectancies offered a crude revealed
preference accountancy framework to operate under. The more
recent analysis makes use of market theories and in particular the
willingness-to-pay of individuals to avoid death or injury; basically a
quasi-actuarial estimation procedure. The methodology has now move
from the revealed-preference approach of the ex-anti and ex-post evalu-
ations, to a revealed preference framework. Individuals are asked, albeit
in a very controlled environment, how much they would be willing to
pay to reduce the chance of a major accident. This amount, when com-
binedwith the actual probability of an accident and the number of trav-
elers, offers an estimate of the value of enhancing safety.42 In some rate cases the expected overall safety recordmay be forecast to beworse after
a change to the transportation system, in which case accidents become a cost item in the
calculation.
3 For a survey, see Michael Jones-Lee and Graham Loomes [4].
4 For an account of parallel calculation methods regarding the safety of freight being
transported see, Ian Savage [5].There are clearly technical challenges with the willingness-to-pay
approach, such as deﬁning the appropriate sampling fame and couching
apposite questions, but it is now widely used for assessing the value to
individuals of reducing the probability of having an accident. We stay
away from the issue of the appropriateness of the methodology, and
whether it can be applied with any degree of accuracy, and consider
the implications of applying the wrong multiplicand to individuals'
values of safety enhancement. In otherwords, what are the implications
of poor trafﬁc forecasts on the overall value of safety improvements
even if economists get individuals' monetary values of safety changes
broadly correct?
From a forecasting perspective, a major input into appraising the ac-
cident beneﬁts and costs transportation initiatives are, therefore, pre-
dictions of future trafﬁc levels; having good estimates of the costs of
each accident are of limited use in a cost-beneﬁt analysis without
good predictions of the numbers of accidents.5 There is an abundance
of analysis of what factors cause accidents – road design, alcohol
and drug consumption, driver training, and so on – but the volume of
trafﬁc, when it occurs, the routes being used, and its composition are
perhaps the main factors when assessing major investments and policy
changes.6
The fact that trafﬁc forecasts are themselves historical and often
been poor is a given fact, but bygones-are-bygones and the issues here
are with regard to improving future cost-beneﬁt analysis assessments.
The on-going concern about sustainable development, and in particular
the inﬂuential Stern Report [7], has been changing the way that
discounting rates are determined in cost-beneﬁt calculations (the i in
Eq. (1)). Basically, if we adopt the underlying notions of sustainability
set out in the Brundtland Report, and especially that the overall resource
base on Earth should bemaintained for future generations, the discount
rate in cost-beneﬁt analysis should be near zero. From a practical per-
spective this means that long-term trafﬁc predictions and accident
costs play a verymuch larger role in estimating net present values of in-
vestments; e.g.with an 8% social discount rate cost-beneﬁt analyses are
dominated by considerations twelve years or so into the future, butwith
a 1% rate accident rates 80 years or more ahead still heavily inﬂuence
the calculations. Even if the value of a life saved is accurate in both
cases, a small error in trafﬁc forecasts will affect the associate aggregate
number of accidents and their costs.3. Record of transportation forecasters
3.1. The numbers
The trafﬁc forecasts used in cost-beneﬁt analysis, despite the numer-
ous years of engagement of trafﬁc engineers, the marketing of “sophis-
ticated” software by transportation consultants, and the development of
better data collection procedures, remain generally poor.7 But before
moving to consider just how inaccurate forecasts often are, there is a
need to consider what level of accuracy is needed in the safety compo-
nent of a cost-beneﬁt analysis, which, after all is a somewhat different
calculation with regard to the physical engineering maintenance or
ﬁnancing of a facility.requires calculated conﬁdence intervals for forecast and the prediction intervals for ob-
served outcomes to be regarded with some caution.”
6 Hakim et al. [6] provide a useful if now a little dated survey of the macro factors that
have been found important in determining surface transportation accidents. These are ob-
viously important for considering speciﬁc safety initiatives, but here the focus is in the ac-
cident implications of more general transportation changes.
7 Mackinder and Evans [8] provided an early critique of U.K. forecasts.
8 The London study noted in the previous footnote was of the four-stage variety.
9 There are someevidence of improvements, although not all agree, in our ability to pro-
duce reasonable medium and long-term forecasting of such things as income, demo-
graphics, and fuel prices that feed into transportation forecasts [19].
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the cost and beneﬁts associatedwith a project; if they are a small part of
the overall picture then accuracy in estimating the willingness-to-pay
for their reduction and the associated trafﬁc levels on the facility are
of limited importance. In most cases travel time saving tends to domi-
nate the assessments, but accidents are costly. One estimate, for exam-
ple, and one surrounding with some level of uncertainty given the
methodology used, is that the direct costs of highway accidents in the
U.S. amount to about 2.6% of the gross national product, rising to over
6.5% when a wider deﬁnition of costs is used [9]. These are not trivial
numbers, and public policy considerations suggest that cost effective
policies at themicro, project level could yield large beneﬁts. Getting traf-
ﬁc forecasts “right” to allow reliable assessments of the absolute and
relative safety gains from individual initiatives would seem desirable.
Despite this, that the use of many transportation models have pro-
duce poor forecasts seems difﬁcult to argue with. We just cite a few ex-
amples as illustrations but the list is just a fragment of what has
occurred but may be taken as broad representative. In the 1990s, a se-
ries of studies in the U.S., including those by the likes of Donald Pickrell
[10] and JohnKain [11] brought into question the forecasts of transit rid-
ership and costs of investments. Pickrell's analysis of programs funded
by the U.S. Federal Urban Mass Transportation Administration, for ex-
ample, found that of the ten projects examined, only the Washington
heavy rail transit project experienced actual patronage more than half
of that forecast. Up-dating of this work and looking at cost and ridership
forecasts for 47 U.S. transit systems indicate only limited improvements
over time [12].
More recently, Bent Flyvbjerg et al. [13], looking across a range of
surface transportation forecasts, have shown considerable inaccuracies
extending to most western economies. There emerges, in particular a
tendency for over-prediction of capacity utilization across a wide
range of countries — e.g. for ten rail projects the passenger forecasts
overestimated trafﬁc by 106%, whereas for road projects there is a ten-
dency for the forecasts to be wrong by about 20% but with the errors
spreading equally around the ultimate ﬂows. More narrowly, in a
study of over 100 international, privately ﬁnanced road project ap-
praisals conducted between 2002 and 2005, Robert Bain [14] concludes
that, “…in terms of error, the predictive accuracy of trafﬁc models –
used for toll road or toll free road forecasts – is poor.” Again there
emerges a proclivity to overestimate trafﬁc ﬂows, with the ratio of actu-
al to forecast trafﬁc falling below unity for the majority of studies, al-
though in some cases the predictions underestimated by up to 51%.
The accuracy of forecasts did not appear to improve over time. This is
not to say that all forecasts were over predicted, but the wide-ranging
cases examined by Flyvbjerg and others offer strong evidence of a gen-
eral tendency.
3.2. The causes
There are a number of reasons for the tendency to over forecast the
trafﬁc effects of a transportation initiative, some technical and have to
dowith themodels used, but others have little to dowith themechanics
of the process, indeed these may be the dominant factor in many cases.
In fact, there are three broad and entwined reasons why transportation
forecasts are generally poor [15].
• The models used for forecasting are often excessively aggregate, and
frequently fail to reﬂect key features of human behavior. In particular,
there is a tendency, often because of the ready availability of suites of
software, to use the engineering driven “four-step”modeling frame-
work that is generally driven by zonal data and has limited ability to
handle the types of feedbacks that occur as travel policies interact
with human behavior [16]. They are, as a consequence, often not par-
ticularly accurate in forecasting what will happen as planning or pol-
icy initiatives are introduced. As Daniel McFadden [17] pointed out in
his Nobel Lecture, while the conventional aggregate gravity modelforecast a 15% mode share for San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART) system, his disaggregate forecast was 6.3% and the actuality
was 6.2%. Despite this, BART has never subsequently adopted disag-
gregate modeling as part of its policy assessments.8 Another example,
in this instance relating to road investments and, much against the
grain for trafﬁc forecasting, resulting in underestimation of trafﬁc
growth. The M25 London orbital road was completed in 1986 and it
was predicted that on 21 of the 26 three-lane sections the trafﬁc
ﬂow would be between 50,000 and 79,000 vehicles a day in the
15th year of operation, whereas the ﬂow within a very short time
was between 81,400 and 129,000.
• The collection of appropriate data to calibrate the models used pro-
duces forecasts that are challenging, as is the prediction of even the
short-term future path of many explanatory variables. Most forecasts
rely on extrapolations of previous behavior; and thus assume constan-
cy in what inﬂuences individuals' decision-making. This is difﬁcult to
do, but there are the added complications of trend breaks and of en-
tirely new developing trends. Static economic models, for example,
have difﬁculties not only in incorporating the catch-all variable
“taste” that inﬂuences travel behavior but are prone to use Cobb–
Douglas based functions that assume travel demand elasticities do
not changewith variations in other, commonly used independent var-
iables such as income and price.9 The use of sensitivity analysis and
simulations can provide some insights, but the range of possibilities
increases as the length of the forecast period gets extended.
• There is often manipulation of forecasts, either directly or more co-
vertly, by their ultimate users. The problem here is seen not so
much as a technical one of bad modeling, or even forecasting, but of
the way projections are selected to meet the particular aims of the
“client”. Put simply, transportation forecasts are not politically neutral,
and many decisions regarding transportation investments and policy
are not made in the public interest, but to some degree serve the
ends of thosewhoaremaking or using them. Technically, the forecast-
ingprocess, and its output, is prone to being “captured”. MartinWachs
[18] gives numerous anecdotal examples supporting this situation,
whereby local planners in the U.S. were essentially forced to adjust
forecasts so as to gain federal grant aid, or consultants were continu-
ally rehired for projects despite a history of biased forecasting.
One could argue that, while the fact of poor trafﬁc forecasts has rel-
evance for safety considerations, their causes are of less interest. This,
however, misses the point thatmany of the forces leading to poor trafﬁc
projections stem from “political” factors, and often less from technical
inadequacies, although the latter are not frequently still important.
The decision to select forecasts that meet the pre-conceived ideas of de-
cision makers, or their particular predilections, could also indicate that
the values of safety expected in the cost-beneﬁt analysis are not objec-
tive. It brings into question the integrity of the entire cost-beneﬁt analy-
sis methodology. It also means that trying to improve forecasting
through better modeling, the development of more ﬂexible software,
or enhanced data collectionmethods is unlikely to improve the situation;
the “decision-makers”will simply select the predictions that they “like”.
4. Potential implications of poor trafﬁc forecasts on safety
Poor aggregated trafﬁc forecasts being fed into Eq. (1), assuming that
the investment or policy being assessed is seen as potentially reducing
accidents, will obviously affect the value of the aggregate safety beneﬁts,
but depending on the nature of the project, errorsmay come in different
forms. Much of the analysis of trafﬁc forecasting errors that has been
conducted recently by Flyvbjerg and others have focused on aggregate
Q25
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much less than predicted, then travelers are likely to be using other
links in the overall transport network, and possibly at different times
than the forecast; indeed they may not travel at all but engage in some
other activity that is risk free. Given that some of the trafﬁc that is fore-
cast to use the new facility but does not do so, is "generated trafﬁc" then
the individuals involved, rather than driving, must be spending their
time on some other activity.
From a safety perspective, these raise complex questions of what
exactly are the risks confronting those who do actually use the new fa-
cilities that in aggregate have less trafﬁc than expected, as well as ques-
tions about the safety of those forecasts on whether to use it or not.
From an economic perspective there is the additional need to put mon-
etary values on these changes in risk.
If there was a direct linear link between trafﬁc volume and accidents
on a corridor then it would be possible to deploy some form of scalar to
capture any trafﬁcmis-forecasts if there is a historical record of poor fore-
casting. For example, if trafﬁc forecasts have in the past seen a tendency
to over predict trafﬁc by 10%, then it may be assumed that accidents will
be over the forecast by 10% in subsequent exercises and a10% adjustment
made. Alternatively some other form of adjustments, say based upon
what macroeconomists might call rational expectations may be made.10
The link between trafﬁc levels and accident numbers is often complex,
and in particular non-linear in its nature, making such adjustments difﬁ-
cult, and essentially often arbitrary in their nature. A number of particular
issues arise in this context, and we highlight some of the main ones.
• Congestion. Congestion and accidents are important components of
the social costs created and associatedwith roadusers inmetropolitan
areas. Among the factors that inﬂuence the number of fatalities on
highways are; speed, speed differences and trafﬁc composition. Em-
pirical evaluations by Daniel Shefer and Piet Rietveld [23], for exam-
ple, show that lower speeds caused by congestion lead to smaller
numbers of fatal accidents, producing a parabolic relationship
between density and fatal accidents on highways.11 When densities
increase, we initially witness a positive relationship due to the in-
crease in the number of cars in the system, but when density becomes
so high that speeds are inﬂuenced negatively, the number of accidents
decreases. The conclusion is that in addition to the negative impact of
congestion in terms of time losses, we also have a positive impact to
consider because fatalities are reduced. If trafﬁc forecasts are inaccu-
rate and that there is not only the direct volume effect on accident
levels but also potentially compounding effects due to trafﬁc speeds,
forecast also inevitably being wrong; in many cases, for example, an
over estimation of trafﬁc may result in an increase in safety that is off-
set because trafﬁc speeds are higher due to less congestion, and with
these accidents being more serious.
• Mode split. It is generally considered that public transportation
modes – busses, rapid transportation, and rail in our context – are
safer than automobiles, and thus are often partly supported on the
grounds that they will reduce accidents.12 But the evidence available
is that the cross-elasticity of demand between public and private
modes tends to change over time, and that the forecastingwith regard
to the use of public mode tends to be particularly optimistic with ex-
cessively high-cross-elasticities being used [10,13].13 Thus even if the10 While not discussed here, a number of suggestion to reduce this tendency to overstate
demand for transportation have been offered, see Kenneth Button and Brien Benson [20],
Flyvbjerg [21], and Flyvbjerg with COWI [22].
11 In another study, JakeKononov et al. [24] used safety performance functions calibrated
for multilane freeways in Colorado, California, and Texas, and neural networks to identify
the underlying relationship between safety and exposure.
12 For example the chances of being killed per mile traveled in an automobile in the U.S.
are about 6.5 times that on being in a bus or coach.
13 Pickrell's study of programs funded by the U.S. Urban Mass Transportation Adminis-
tration in the 1980s, for example, found that of the ten projects examined only theWash-
ington heavy rail transit project experienced actual patronage more than half of the
forecast.aggregate demand for transportation (essentially the trip generation)
is fairly accurate, poor predictions of themodal split will produce poor
guidance to the safety implications of a project; in most cases it will
over estimate reductions in accidents.
• Route choice. Linked somewhat to congestion considerations, follow-
ing “Wardrop's Principles” [25], a given level of trafﬁc tends to spread
itself across a network in such a way that the average journey time is
minimized.14 This means that if aggregate trafﬁc poorly predicted,
then there is a feed down effect in the conventional four-stagemodel-
ing that still underliesmost trafﬁc forecasting that result in a reassign-
ment of road trafﬁc by routes. This reassignment is generally based on
travel time minimization considerations a laWardrop, but may also
include some consideration of themoney costs of travel within a gen-
eralized cost function. These spatial and temporal patterns of trafﬁc
are likely to be somewhat different to that in the forecast, and with
these come different patterns of accidents; freeways, for example, in
most countries have fewer accidents than other types of road. There
is little evidence to suggest that individuals take into account safety
considerations when selecting a particular routing, and especially
not in urban areas.5. Conclusions
One of the biggest problems in conducting a cost-beneﬁt analysis of
any piece of transportation infrastructure is the forecasting of numbers
of accidents to be anticipated, and the subsequent placing of monetary
values on the physical and human damages that result. While consider-
able effort has been put into understanding and modeling the causes of
trafﬁc accidents, and into placing monetary values of reducing the risks
of individuals being involved in an accident, this information is of limit-
ed use in social appraisal of transportation projects. If the forecasts of
trafﬁc are seriously inaccurate then the base numbers of accidents and
their severity per vehicle mile are of little use in estimating the overall
changes in the costs of accidents; essentially better trafﬁc forecasts are
required. Unfortunately, the pressures on those doing research are to
produce models that explain past trends, generally taking their useful-
ness for forecasting as a secondary consideration, rather than conduct
ex post analysis to see just how accurate the cost-beneﬁt projections
have been.
References
[1] J. Broughton, Forecasting road accidents casualties in Great Britain, Accid. Anal. Prev.
23 (1991) 353–362.
[2] U. Brüde, What is happening to the number of fatalities in road accidents? A model
for forecasting and continuously monitoring of development up to the year 2000,
Accid. Anal. Prev. 27 (1995) 405–410.
[3] P.J. Mackie, J. Nellthorp, Cost-beneﬁt in transport, in: K.J. Button, D. Hensher
(Eds.), Handbook of Transport Systems and Trafﬁc Control, Pergamon, Oxford,
2001, pp. 143–174.
[4] M. Jones-Lee, G. Looms, Valuation of safety, in: D.A. Hensher, K.J. Button (Eds.),
Handbook of Transport and the Environment, Elsevier, Oxford, 2003, pp. 451–462.
[5] I. Savage, The economics of commercial transportation safety, in: J. Gómez-Ibáñez,
W.B. Tye, C.Winston (Eds.), Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Hand-
book in Honor of John R. Meyer, The Brooking Institution, Washington D.C., 1999,
pp. 531–562.
[6] S. Hakim, D. Shefer, A.S. Hakkert, I. Hocherman, A critical review ofmacromodels for
road accidents, Accid. Anal. Prev. 23 (1991) 379–400.
[7] N. Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, Cabinet Ofﬁce –HMTrea-
sury, London, 2007.
[8] I. Mackinder, S. Evans, The predictive accuracies of British transport studies in urban
areas, TRRL Report SR 699, Crowthorne, 1981.14 Strictly, his ﬁrst principle states that the journey times in all routes used are equal and
less than those that would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route. Each
user non-cooperatively seeks to minimize his cost of transportation. His second principle
is that at equilibrium the average journey time isminimum. This implies that eachuser be-
haves cooperatively in choosing a route to ensure the most efﬁcient use of the whole sys-
tem; essentially this ismarginal cost pricing involving time costs, rather thanmoney costs
as originally developed by Frank Knight [26].
31K. Button / IATSS Research 38 (2014) 27–31[9] T.R. Miller, J. Viner, J.S. Rossman, N. Pindus, W. Gellert, J. Douglass, A. Dillingham, G.
Blomquist, The costs of highway crashes, Final Report, U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, Washington, DC, 1991. (FHWA-RD-91-055).
[10] D.H. Pickrell, A desire named streetcar: fantasy and fact in rail transit planning,
J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 58 (1992) 158–176.
[11] J. Kain, Deception in Dallas: strategic misrepresentation in rail transit promotion and
evaluation, J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 56 (1990) 184–196.
[12] K.J. Button, S. Doh,M.H.Hardy, J. Yuan, X. Zhou, The accuracy of transit system ridership
forecasts and capital cost estimates, Int. J. Transp. Econ. 37 (2010) 155–168.
[13] B. Flyvbjerg, M. Holm, S.L. Buhl, How (in)accurate are demand forecasts in public
works projects? The case of transportation, J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 71 (2005) 131–146.
[14] R. Bain, Error and optimism bias in toll road trafﬁc forecasts, Transportation 36
(2009) 469–482.
[15] K.J. Button, Does the primary problem of applying cost-beneﬁt analysis to transpor-
tation policies lie in the methodology or in the forecasts used? in: E. Van de Voorde,
T. Vanelslander (Eds.), Applied Transport Economics: A Management and Policy
Perspective, De Boeck, Antwerp, 2011, pp. 477–496.
[16] M.G. McNally, The four-stepmodel, in: D.A. Hensher, K.J. Button (Eds.), Handbook of
Transport Modelling, Second edition, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 35–53.
[17] D. McFadden, Economic choices, Am. Econ. Rev. (2001) 351–378.[18] M. Wachs, When planners lie with numbers, J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 55 (1989) 476–479.
[19] A. D'Agostino, L. Gambetti, D. Giannone, Macroeconomic forecasting and structural
change, Working Paper 1167, European Central Bank, Frankfurt, 2010.
[20] K.J. Button, B. Benson, Handling biases in forecasting when transportation policy-
making, in: T. Vanoutrive, A. Verhetsel (Eds.), Smart Transport Networks: Decision
Making, Sustainability and Market Structure, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013,
pp. 49–67.
[21] B. Flyvbjerg, Curbing optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation in planning:
reference class forecasting in practice, Eur. Plan. Stud. 16 (2008) 3–21.
[22] B. Flyvbjerg, COWI, Procedures for dealing with optimism bias in transport planning,
Guidance Document, Department for Transport, London, 2004.
[23] D. Shefer, P. Rietveld, Congestion and safety on highways: towards an analytical
model, Urban Stud. 34 (1997) 679–692.
[24] J. Kononov, B. Bailey, B.K. Allery, Relationships between safety and both congestion
and number of lanes on urban freeways, Transp. Res. Rec. 2083 (2008) 26–39.
[25] J.G. Wardrop, J.I. Whitehead, Correspondence. Some theoretical aspects of road traf-
ﬁc research, ICE Proc. Eng. Div. 1 (1952) 767–768.
[26] F.H. Knight, Some fallacies in the interpretation of social costs, Q. J. Econ. 38 (1924)
582–606.
